Repressed Memories
“Repressed memories are a figment of the imagination”. Critically discuss this statement.
The concept of repression – which is the bone of contention between those who believe in the mission of recovery therapy and those who denounce it – presumes a peculiar power of the mind (Loftus and Ketchum, 1994).
The current dispute regarding the existence of repression has mainly focused on whether people remember or forget trauma. Repression, however, is a multidimensional construct, which, in addition to the memory aspect, consists of pathogenic effects on adjustment and the unconscious (Rofe´, 2008).
The challenges of memory recovery have not escaped judicial attention. Courts have increasingly found repressed memory testimony to be challenging in terms of its admissibility as valid and reliable evidence (Lipton, 1999).
Sigmund Freud (1914) viewed repression as the “foundation stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests” (p. 297). It is therefore no wonder that “Hundreds of psychoanalytic investigations have been interpreted as either propping up or tearing down this cornerstone” (Gur and Sackeim, 1979, p. 167). However, despite research efforts, the psychology community is polarized regarding the validity of this concept. On the one hand, in line with harsh criticism against psychoanalysis in general, numerous investigators question the validity of repression, claiming that it needs to be abandoned (Bonanno and Keuler, 1998; Court and Court, 2001; Pendergrast, 1997; Piper, Pope, and Borowiecki, 2000; Pope, Oliva, and Hudson, 1999). On the other hand, psychoanalysis continues to be one of the central theories of psychopathology, and many investigators believe that repression is a valid concept (Bowers and Farvolden, 1996; Brown, Scheflin, and Whitfield, 1999; Cheit, 1998; Eagle, 2000a, 2000b; Talvitie and Ihanus, 2003; Westen, 1998a, 1999). The debate has focused mainly on clarifying whether people remember or forget trauma. However, repression
The concept of repression – which is the bone of contention between those who believe in the mission of recovery therapy and those who denounce it – presumes a peculiar power of the mind (Loftus and Ketchum, 1994).
The current dispute regarding the existence of repression has mainly focused on whether people remember or forget trauma. Repression, however, is a multidimensional construct, which, in addition to the memory aspect, consists of pathogenic effects on adjustment and the unconscious (Rofe´, 2008).
The challenges of memory recovery have not escaped judicial attention. Courts have increasingly found repressed memory testimony to be challenging in terms of its admissibility as valid and reliable evidence (Lipton, 1999).
Sigmund Freud (1914) viewed repression as the “foundation stone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests” (p. 297). It is therefore no wonder that “Hundreds of psychoanalytic investigations have been interpreted as either propping up or tearing down this cornerstone” (Gur and Sackeim, 1979, p. 167). However, despite research efforts, the psychology community is polarized regarding the validity of this concept. On the one hand, in line with harsh criticism against psychoanalysis in general, numerous investigators question the validity of repression, claiming that it needs to be abandoned (Bonanno and Keuler, 1998; Court and Court, 2001; Pendergrast, 1997; Piper, Pope, and Borowiecki, 2000; Pope, Oliva, and Hudson, 1999). On the other hand, psychoanalysis continues to be one of the central theories of psychopathology, and many investigators believe that repression is a valid concept (Bowers and Farvolden, 1996; Brown, Scheflin, and Whitfield, 1999; Cheit, 1998; Eagle, 2000a, 2000b; Talvitie and Ihanus, 2003; Westen, 1998a, 1999). The debate has focused mainly on clarifying whether people remember or forget trauma. However, repression