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Kodak

Analysis of Kodak (A) HBR case

What is your opinion on Kodak's actions as regards to digital imaging until 1997? To what extent were they appropriate?

The organizations mantra has been focused on traditional film for so long it was difficult for them to transition their thinking and understand the potential risk for that business to decline. Once Fisher took over, he was anxious to move into electronics and hardware based on his background. They moved directly from a wary and shallow approach to a speedy and narrow approach by focusing on hardware. Below I addressed each action individually.

In 1983, Chandler created a "photographic and information" management division to explore new technologies

Although this was a move in the right direction and the timing was fine, it was a very casual approach to look at changing the business. It was inappropriate because they used Kodak people from the traditional business rather than computer engineers whose skills are better suited for this exploration. According to John White, "Kay and Colby would tell you they wanted change, but they didn't want to force the pain on the organization" (Gavetti et al, 2003). Perhaps the company culture was still focused on the traditional film market and declining market share.

Mid-80s Kodak developed a research lab for electronics in Japan

Again, this is another casual and inappropriate attempt based on a "gut feeling" according to CTO at the time (Gavetti et al, 2003). They were not financed directly and had to lobby for funding from different business units. Although they developed the Kodakvision video system, and created some alliances, their heart was still not in it. According to Leo Thomas, "We're moving into an information-based company (but) it's very hard to find anything (with profit margins) like color photography that is legal" (Gavetti et al, 2004, 5).

From 1986 to 1989 they launched an image sensor, created an electronic photography division and...