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Intelligence in World War II. Intelligence agencies ... Intelligence was
especially key during World War II. Frequently, operational ...
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military intelligence play in World War II? What role did ...
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... After World War I, Russia had 9,150,000 casualties and ... that is surrounded by a
capitalist world, is subject ... punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service. ...
Submitted by lavocatus on December 17, 2005
Category: American History
Words: 2874 | Pages: 12
Views: 131
Popularity Rank: 60,778
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Intelligence agencies of the United States have made vast strides since their inception in the early twentieth century. However, during their early days, there were many gaps in technology and the abilities of the agents, but intelligence agencies also had some major successes. Intelligence was especially key during World War II. Frequently, operational failures during World War II were due to either a lack of or error in intelligence, a failure to funnel the information down to the appropriate commanders, and/or the subsequent misuse of the information. This problem can be seen in both the European theater in the Ardennes Forest, and in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor.
The intelligence failures relevant to the German offensive in the Ardennes Forest in 1944 were general and cannot be attributed to any person or group of persons. By mid-September, the Western Allies believed certain victory was in their hands due to military successes, including bloody defeats the Soviet armies had inflicted on the Germans. This optimism was temporarily dispelled when German armies steadfastly defended the West Wall. As the Allies resumed their offensive plans in late November and early December, the earlier optimism returned. It appeared to many that attrition was depleting the German forces of both men and supplies, and that their lines were much weaker than they appeared to be. These reports helped shape the Allied opinion of the both the enemy’s plans and their ability to carry them out. This shield of false hope within the upper echelons served to blind commanders to the real situation at hand (Matthias 25).
The return of Field Marshal von Rundstedt to command in the west also helped mold Allied decisions, since he was thought to be one of the best soldiers in the world. He was a commander who could be expected to act and react rationally and according to the accepted canons of the military art. He would conserve his dwindling resources, counterattack in a...
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