Hurst Error Analysis
Despite the fact that this Court has found the Hurst error harmless in some cases without evidentiary development, this Court has never done so when a defendant has proffered evidence and been denied a hearing. Appellant requested a hearing based on a substantial evidentiary proffer showing the extent of the Hurst error in his case. This proffer cast doubt on what the outcome of his penalty phase would have been without the constitutional error. In light of Appellant’s proffer, the circuit court should have held an evidentiary hearing on harmless error. This Court should remand for such a hearing.
A defendant is generally entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000). A circuit court can only …show more content…
This Court did exactly that after the United States Supreme Court held that a jury must be allowed to consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). In the wake of that decision, the State made essentially the same argument they are today: there was a Hitchcock violation, but the error was harmless. This Court rejected that line of argument because it refused to be bound by the face of the record. Instead, this Court permitted defendants who proffered evidence of the extent of the harm of the constitutional error to develop that evidence at a …show more content…
In Meeks v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 1991), the petitioner, through proffered evidence, was able to demonstrate exactly how Florida’s unconstitutional pre-Hitchcock capital scheme effected his penalty-phase counsel. This evidence was “sufficient to negate the conclusion that the Hitchcock error was harmless” and this Court remanded his case because “the merits of [Meeks’] claims can only be determined by an evidentiary hearing.” Id. In Hall v. State, 541 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1989), this Court granted relief on evidence preferred outside the original record concerning the effect of the constitutional error on defense counsel, despite the fact that this Court considered the error harmless on the basis of the original record. Appellant is simply seeking the exact same right that this Court has always provided inmates- the ability to develop a record demonstrating the impact of an unconstitutional statute on his trial
A defendant is generally entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000). A circuit court can only …show more content…
This Court did exactly that after the United States Supreme Court held that a jury must be allowed to consider nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987). In the wake of that decision, the State made essentially the same argument they are today: there was a Hitchcock violation, but the error was harmless. This Court rejected that line of argument because it refused to be bound by the face of the record. Instead, this Court permitted defendants who proffered evidence of the extent of the harm of the constitutional error to develop that evidence at a …show more content…
In Meeks v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. 1991), the petitioner, through proffered evidence, was able to demonstrate exactly how Florida’s unconstitutional pre-Hitchcock capital scheme effected his penalty-phase counsel. This evidence was “sufficient to negate the conclusion that the Hitchcock error was harmless” and this Court remanded his case because “the merits of [Meeks’] claims can only be determined by an evidentiary hearing.” Id. In Hall v. State, 541 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1989), this Court granted relief on evidence preferred outside the original record concerning the effect of the constitutional error on defense counsel, despite the fact that this Court considered the error harmless on the basis of the original record. Appellant is simply seeking the exact same right that this Court has always provided inmates- the ability to develop a record demonstrating the impact of an unconstitutional statute on his trial