Casullo’s Fourth Version Of The Bundle Theory
The bundle theory states that any thing is simply a complex of properties which all stand in a contingent relation, called co-instantiation, to one another. Basically an object is nothing more than a collection of its properties. The bundle theory is an alternative to other theories of particulars such as the substratum theory and the substance theory of particulars. James Van Cleve proposes a few objections that he considers to be severely damaging to the bundle theory. In Casullo’s “Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory,” he attempts to get around the objections that Van Cleve poses to the bundle theory.
Van Cleve has a few main objections to the bundle theory, the three most important being the problem of change, the problem of contingency, and the fact that the bundle theory relies on the identity of indiscernibles. The problem of change states that since an object is just a set of properties, if one property changes, so too does the object. The problem of identity across time is important because the very nature of change is such that it consists of the same individual undergoing a change, rather than a new individual being created whenever a property is added, subtracted, or changed. The problem of contingency is related to the problem of change. As soon as any property changes, the identity of the object changes, and thus every property is treated as essential. Van Cleve also points out that the bundle theory requires the identity of indiscernibles as a truth, which is often questioned. Leibniz’s identity of indiscernibles states that if two objects have exactly the same properties, then they must be the same object. This is particularly controversial because it entails there can be no two individuals that are exactly alike.
In Casullo’s “A Fourth Version of the Bundle Theory,” each one of these objections is taken on one at a time and a new version of the bundle theory is created. In order to evaluate the problem of...
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